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BANKING IN CANADA
DANIEL J. BAUM*
The means by which banking is regulated in Canada is quite
distinct from the methods which are employed in the United
States. Moreover, the jurisdictional boundary between provincial
regulation of securities and federal regulation of banking has
created a regulatory penumbral zone. Additionally, the fact that
the present regulation is largely the product of consultation be-
tween the banking industry and the government raises the ques-
tion of the effectiveness of a regulatory scheme which is essen-
tially consensual. The banking industry in Canada, as 'well as that
of the United States, appears to be departing from its traditional
role. The extent to which current regulation will be effective in
these areas is perhaps the most important question confronted in
this comprehensive treatment of Canadian banking.
PREFACE
Banks are the largest of the Canadian institutional investors, holding
more than 10 times the combined assets of the mutual funds. This con-
centration is accentuated in that over 90 percent of the industry's assets
are held by five of the nine Canadian banks.1 Both the size of Canadian
banks and their high degree of asset concentration result from the con-
scious implementation of a state-conceived public policy. It is in light
of this policy that the banking law must be considered if one is to under-
stand the relationship between Canadian law and banking behavior. Of
equal importance is the developing role of banks in the equity market, a
role which runs contrary to traditional notions viewing banks solely as
Professor, Faculties of Law and Administrative Studies, Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University, Toronto. The author expresses his deep appreciation to Gerald
KIuwack and Marvin Yontef, his research assistants for their assistance. The views ex-
pressed in this article are solely those of the author.
1 The nine chartered banks and their assets are as follows:
Bank Assets as of
December 31,1960
Royal Bank of Canada $9.16 billion
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 8.35 billion
Bank of Montreal 6.99 billion
Bank of Nova Scotia 5.20 billion
Toronto Dominion Bank 4.49 billion
La Banque Canadienne Nationale 1.49 billion
Banque Provinciale du Canada 760 million
Mercantile Bank of Canada 190 million
Bank of British Columbia .36 million
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institutions which keep the depositor's money protected and liquid
while seeking a return on investments greater than the interest which
they are obliged to pay.
Historically, the law supported this traditional view of banking. In
the Quebec Vacant Property case2 Lord Porter defined the relationship
of banker and customer as that of debtor and creditor, with the banker
having an additional obligation of honoring the customer's draft. For
obvious reasons, the debtor-creditor relationship has been fundamental
to bank investment behavior: As creditor, the depositor can demand
withdrawal of all his money and the bank, regardless of its investments,
must meet that demand. Viewed against the bank's obligation to pay a
fixed return, this bank-depositor relationship reveals no inherent flexi-
bility.3 In addition, three factors traditionally have been used to meas-
ure the attractiveness of an investment-security, yield, and liquidity. In
light of these factors, the banking industry poses a regulatory dilemma;
even though security is an all-encompassing consideration and the tra-
ditional banker-depositor relationship emphasizes liquidity, the nature of
the fixed obligation emphasizes the importance of yield.
HISTORY OF REGULATION
The first general banking statute in Canada was passed in 1871. 4
There were already a considerable number of banks in Canada and their
early incorporation, by renewable letters patent, had resulted in that
industry's being distinguishable from the outset. The first Act was
largely the result of consultations between the legislature and the bank-
ers and was passed with little opposition. 5 The original Act had the same
form as the current legislation, the Bank Act of 1967,6 and was the com-
prehensive company charter of the banks. It has been suggested that the
main reasons for the enactment of this general banking law were his-
2 Attorney-general of Canada v. Attorney-general of Quebec, [1947J 1 D.L.R. 81, 87
(1946), citing Foley v. Hill, 9 Eng. Rep. 1002 (H.L. 1848).
a By way of contrast, a mutual fund provides an example of a management with
inherent flexibility in investment. Whereas the investor in a mutual fund is prepared
for and in fact welcomes a fluctuating value in his investment, the depositor in a bank
expects his capital to remain constant and looks to a fixed rate of interest on the
deposited money. M. WATKINS, REPORT ON STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDuSTRY 389 (1968).
4The Dominion Banking Act, 1871, 34 Vict., c. 5 (Can.). The banks had also re-
ceived special attention in the British North America Act which provided that the
legislative authority, concerning banking, incorporation of banks, and the issuance of
paper money would be vested exclusively in the Parliament of Canada. 30 Vict., c. 3,
§ 91(15) (Can. 1867).
5 See I. BAXr=R, THE LAw OF BANKING AND THE CANADIAN BANK AcT 1-5 (2d ed. 1968);
A. JAMiEsON, CHARTERE BANKING IN CANADA 3-16 (1953).
6 CAN. STAT. c. 87 (1967).
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torical, Canada's recent confederation and the experimental state of the,
banking industry prompting a desire for uniform operation of banking
with fairly detailed legal controls.7  Although these conditions were
not the sole justification for current regulation, and were not considered
to be of primary significance by the Porter Commission," current bank
regulation clearly reflects this historic example of a successful model
of regulation. Control by means of a central act, however, is only one
means of successful banking regulation; others, such as those employed
in the United States and Great Britain, have been just as effective.9
In enacting the statute, the legislature included, as far as practicable,
all of the laws relating to banking. Of special significance is the fact
that banks are the only institution named in the Act, and they are sub-
ject exclusively to federal control. Modem Canadian banking regula-
tion, therefore, is not the result of arbitrary legislation or the general en-
actment of settled principles. As first enacted, the legislation was the
product of consultation between the banking industry and the govern-
ment. From the bankers' desire for maximum growth potential for their
institutions and the government's need for effective control over the
country's monetary policy, a common interest had developed and this
community of interest has continued to exist.
By 1871, banks were the major financial institution in Canada, and
the Bank Act resulted not only in more effective government control of
the economy, but also in the grant of a limited monopoly to present
members of the industry. The definition of this quasi-monopoly, which
is under exclusive federal control, is somewhat circular: A bank is
permitted to perform such business "as pertains to the business of bank-
ing.") 10
Although the original and 1967 bank acts were acceptable to both
industry and government, governmental policy has not always coincided
with the desires of the industry. In 1967, the interest ceiling was raised"'
and, accordingly, the banks channeled more money into consumer
7 1. BAXTER, supra note 5, at 2.
8 See ROYAL Co M'N ON BAXIMNG AND FINANcE, REPORT (1969) [hereinafter cited as
PORTER CoMM'N REPORT]. The Commission's aim was "to promote continued evolution of
the financial system, to encourage it to be creative and competitive, and to ensure that
it is sound. In our view, an appropriate regulatory environment is one which permits
quiet and efficient adaptation of our banking machinery to the changing needs of
borrowers and lenders . . . ." Id. at 357. While the Commission did mention soundness
and protection for the depositor, it is interesting to note a new emphasis on competi-
tion and creativity in the system.
9 The United States and Great Britain do not use a central act and corporate charter
to regulate the industry.
10 CAN. STAT. c. 87, § 75(1) (e) (1967).
11 d. § 91.
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loans;' 2 shortly thereafter, however, the Canadian government became
concerned with inflation. In an attempt to curb excessive buying pres-
sure, the government was forced to seek a reduction of the availability
of consumer loans by acting through the Governor of the Bank of
Canada.
Governmental efforts in the field of banking have been directed to-
ward the creation and maintenance of an economically powerful bank-
ing system capable of maintaining a strong competitive position vis-a'-vis
other financial institutions; the relationship between the bank and the
customer has been of only incidental concern.Y8 The result has been that
the five Canadian banks which hold more than 90 percent of industry
assets are in an' exceedingly strong competitive position, and entry into
the banking industry is extremely'difficult due to the system of nation-
wide branch banking. The government has benefited from this result by
achieving more effective control over national monetary policy.
. BANKING UNDER THE B.N.A. AcT'
Section 91(15) of the British North America (B.N.A.) Act 4 makes
banking in Canada a matter for federal regulation. Due to the explicit
nature of the statute, the issue most often litigated has'been whether a
certain activity constitutes "banking," and the courts have construed this
term broadly. 5 This broad interpretation of the term "banking" has
resulted in the federal government's exercising a largely preemptory
regulatory power over banks and other closely related financial institu-
tions, even though these institutions may perform functions which are
apparently distinct from the functions enumerated in the Bank Act.'"
12 The intent behind the raising of the interest ceiling may have been the stimulation
of new competition within the financial community. See 1 HOUSE OF COMMONS DFI)AThS,
CANADA, 27th Parl, 1st Sess. 904-05 (1966). Mr. Jack Davis (private member) stated
that one of the main arguments for the removal of the ceiling was "because it would
generate greater competition among the chartered banks, the trust and loan companies,
etc." He pointed out that "chartered banks have not been growing as rapidly as other
institutions in the monetary field. . . . [the Porter Royal Commission found that
chartered bank deposits... in the post war period, have little more than doubled. The
mortgage and loan companies' assets have risen more than six-fold. The trust com-
panies' assets have gone up about seven times." Id.
13 A. ROGERS, FALcONBRIDGE ON BANKING AND BiLLs OF EXCHANGE 57 (7th ed. 1969).
14 30 Vict., c. 3, § 91(15) (Can. 1867).
l5 Tennant v. Union Bank, [1894] A.C. 31 (P.C. 1893) (Can.) involved the conflict of
a provincial act with the federal banking statute. Lord Watson stated that section
91(15) "comprehends 'banking' as an expression which is wide enough to embrace every
transaction coming within the legitimate business of a banker." Id. at 409.
16The province of Alberta attempted to license and control "credit institutions,"
but it expressly excluded functions regulated under the Bank Act. Nonetheless, this
was considered an unconstitutional infringement of the federal-power under 91(15).
In justifying this holding, Viscount Simons indicated that the term "banking"' should
[Vol. 59:11271130
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The equity market is a matter for provincial control; however, neither
the federal government, in controlling banking, nor the provincial gov-
ernments, in controlling the sale of securities, can regulate completely
bank activity in the equity market. The federal government must relate
its control of securities to banking, and it would be beyond federal juris-
diction to enact legislation with regard to trading or registration of
securities.17
There are several examples in both provincial and federal statutes of
attempts to blend jurisdiction. Banks are specifically mentioned in the
Ontario Securities Act of 1966;18 however, section 18(4) 19 exempts
banks from registration of trades, and section 19(5)20 exempts bank
officials from registration as investment counsel. The Bank Act of 1967
does not allow banks to be named in a prospectus and establishes per-
centage limitations on the securities a bank can hold.21 There is not,
however, one all-embracing act which covers bank activity in the
securities market and any legislative attempts in this area necessarily must
operate within the framework of the constitution and the B.N.A. Act.
Self-regulation, coupled with governmental self-interest, may provide
the setting for change.
THE NATURE OF CURRENT REGULATION
Federal jurisdiction over banking is exercised exclusively through the
Bank Act of 196722 and section five makes the Act itself the corporate
charter of the bank. Banks, therefore, are special statute companies,
subject to the doctrine of ultra vires, and the legislature is the grantor of
the corporate charter.
The Act is not aimed at the preservation of assets. There are no
defined relationships of assets-to-debt or of assets-to-capital, and section
72, dealing with cash and secondary reserves, is the only provision which
deals with asset control. The Bank Act does not restrict the amount of
interest banks can charge their customers or pay to their creditors.28
not be restricted to what it meant at the time the Act was passed. Attorney-general
of Alberta v. Attorney-general of Canada, [1947] 4 D.L.R. 1, 9.
17 See ONT. STAT. c. 142, §§ 6-17 (1966).
18 ONT. STAT. c. 142, §§ 18, 19, 118(b) (iv) (1966).
19 Id. § 18(4).
20 Id. § 19(5).
21 CAN. STAT. c. 87, § 76 (1967).
22 d. c. 87.
2 3 Until 1967 the banks could only charge a maximum of six percent interest; however,
banks can now charge interest as they see fit. Id. § 91. Regulation of insurance com-
pany investments, however, is extensive, explicit, and appears to be concerned with
safety. See Canada & British Insurance Companies Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 31, § 63
(1952).
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Similarly, the Bank Act does not delineate the rights and liabilities which
exist between banker and customer. This relationship is dealt with by
the common law.
The Bank Act does contain extensive provisions regarding such areas
as incorporation, structuring, and capitalization. These features are in
line with the corporate charter provision of section five. In addition,
enforcement provisions allow for audit, inspection, and disclosure; how-
ever, banking activities are neither explicitly stated nor rigidly con-
trolled.
The banks' freedom of activity is most apparent in section 75, which
is analogous to the purpose clause in the charter of a business corpora-
tion. This section is framed in broad, general terms and the permitted
activities are summarized in section 75 (1) (e). The Act characterizes the
nature of the banking business in sections 75 through 98, which apply
primarily to lending activities.24 On the basis of these sections, the "busi-
ness of banking" could probably be defined as the short-term lending
of money.
The rationale for this characterization by the legislature may be found
in traditional concepts concerning the relationship between bank and
depositor, which place heavy emphasis upon liquidity. The Bank Act,
however, is broad enough to permit a change in the role of the bank,
even as a short-term lender, and product differentiation-which includes
the creation of diverse savings and loan plans-can help to minimize the
emphasis on liquidity.
EQUITY PARTICIPATION BY BANKS
Prior to enactment of section 76 of the 1967 Bank Act, there was no
express prohibition concerning bank equity holdings; however, banks
could not engage in a trade or business, be named in a prospectus for the
sale of shares, or deal in their shares or the shares of other banks. Only
these prohibitions, coupled with traditional reluctance on the part of
banks to enter the equity market, restricted banks' equity holdings.
Section 76 reflected recommendations made by the Porter Commis-
sion.21 The three major parts of this section deal respectively with the
following areas: (1) stock restrictions applicable to holdings in "ordi-
nary" companies; (2) stock restrictions applicable to holdings in trust
and loan companies; and (3) exceptions to the rules.26 There are no
regulations explaining or modifying this section, nor has there been any
24CAN. STAT. C. 87, §§ 76, 77, 94-98 (1967) (common stock holdings, bank debentures,
and unclaimed balances, respectively).
2 5 PoRkim COMM'N REPORT at 372.
26 CAN. STAT. C. 87, § 76 (1967).
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litigation or reported enforcement of its provisions. Enforcement has
been based on extrajudicial means which chiefly rely upon the close
liaison between the federal government and the bankers, the use of hear-
ings and submissions, and the decennial revision of the Act. Any limita-
dons on the bank's role in the equity market must therefore be deter-
mined from the statute itself.27
The first part of section 76 deals with the ownership of shares in ordi-
nary corporations. The section is framed in the negative, suggesting
that the legislation does not encourage stock ownership. Its prohibitions
relate only to voting shares in Canadian companies, leaving banks free
to buy nonvoting Canadian shares and voting or nonvoting foreign
shares.
Under section 76(1) (a), a bank may own no more than 50 percent of
the issued and outstanding voting shares of a corporation so long as the
aggregate price to the bank is less than five million dollars.28 If the
aggregate purchase price is more than five million dollars, the bank may
hold not more than 10 per cent of the issued and outstanding shares.2 9
The critical figure is five million dollars. If the bank spends less than
that sum, it may hold up to 50 percent of a company's voting shares; if
the bank spends more than five million dollars, it may only hold 10 per-
cent or less.8 °
Section 76(2) (a) controls indirect ownership of Canadian securities.
A bank may not hold shares in a foreign corporation whose ownership
of a Canadian company's shares exceeds the limits set on the banks them-
selves. The prohibition, however, generally does not preclude bank
ownership in foreign corporations, nor does it preclude ownership in
nonresident foreign corporations that actually do business in Canada.
It is important to note the implications of these provisions. The 50
percent and 10 percent restrictions appear to be directed toward con-
rol; however, it is legal, rather than actual or working control that is
the thrust of the statute.31 Furthermore, the limitation on voting shares
27 As a general rule, litigation under the Bank Act is not an adversary proceeding be-
tween the government and the bank. The only litigation arises, in fact, when an indi-
vidual's rights may involve the Bank Act's provisions. In seeking to interpret the
legislation, therefore, the emphasis is not on a case study, but on the hearings and sub-
missions preceding the statute.
28 CAN. STAT. c. 87, § 76(1) (a) (i) (1967).
29 Id. § 76(1) (a) (ii).
80 As the divesting of a bank's interests need not be before 1971, many of the current
holdings in trust companies are not yet "illegal." CAN. STAT. c. 87, § 76(1) (1967).
31 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss what constitutes actual or working
control over a public issue corporation. See generally Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates,
305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly & Clark JJ. concurring). It is clear that it is
not actual control which is contemplated in the Bank Act but merely ownership of a
19711 1133
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alone is unrealistic; control may be exercised within the strictures set.
Moreover, section 76 cannot force diversification insofar as that term
implies liquidity. The section is also highly flexible. It suggests that
banks can exercise indirect controls. Banks can control mutual funds
or holding companies and are relatively free to make equity-oriented
arrangements while not owning stock directly.
The second part of section 76 relates to the ownership of shares in
trust or loan corporations. In these provisions, there is not a five mil-
lion dollar guide. The chartered bank may own no more than 10 per-
cent of the issued and outstanding voting shares in a trust or loan cor-
poration and, regardless of value, excesses must be divested before July
1, 1971;32 moreover, section 76(2) (b) expressly precludes ownership
of shares in a foreign corporation that may have more than a 10 per-
cent voting right in a Canadian trust or loan company. Again, however,
the ownership of foreign trust or loan companies is not prohibited.
The rationale underlying section 76 is multifaceted. Traditionally,
banks have not heavily invested their assets in common stocks"3 and the
felt need for liquidity has inhibited banks from entering the equity mar-
ket. At the same time, the general statutory scheme of the Bank Act has
operated to keep banks in a generally favorable competitive position vis-
a-vis other financial intermediaries, perhaps in large part to provide gov-
ernment influence over the nation's money supply. Section 76 can be
viewed as a tool which is necessary to keep the banks flexible and com-
petitive, with inspection and decennial statutory revision available to
correct any obvious abuse. It was considered preferable, therefore, to
give the banks tools for competition before the need arose, and leave it
to these quasi-public enterprises to use the instrument with discretion.
The government's desire to keep the banks in a good competitive posi-
tion, while preserving a kind of inter-modal competition between banks
and trust companies, resulted in separate section 76 treatment of security
holdings in trust and loan companies. A specific subsection deals with
certain percentage of voting stock; however, the influence which an institutional in-
vestor can exert over a portfolio corporation by using the pressure of the market often
bears no relationship to the percentage of voting stock which it owns in the corpora-
tion. See Baum, Catalyst for Change: Mutual Funds in Canada, 59 GEo. L.J. 249, 293
(1970).
32 See note 30 supra.
33 The Porter Commission stated that, in 1962, only $1.1 billion of the banks' holdings
were in provincial, municipal, and corporate securities. A small portion of this was
in all forms of securities and all of these holdings were growing at a considerably slower
pace than loans. PORTm COM' N REPoRTr 126. Aside from the consideration of the bear
market at the time, this holding of well under five percent of total assets was attributed
to the fixed dollar nature of liabilities and the risks and skills of investment in the area.
Vol. 59:11271134
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bank holdings in trust companies.84 This reflects the Porter Commis-
sion's attempt to prevent banks from operating in areas in which they
possess little expertise, so that they might better exploit their strength.
For example, the controls imposed over security holdings in ordinary
corporations were thought to be a method of insuring against the bank's
dealing in goods, wares, and merchandise or engaging in a trade or
business.35
The third part of section 76 involves exception to the earlier provi-
sions. Under section 76(3), if after having acquired securities the bank
gains voting rights that would violate the restrictions, it is allowed two
years from that time to divest itself. After-acquired voting control
which would arise on the conversion of preferred shares, warrants, or
debentures is exempted from this provision. Although the exception
seems straightforward, a bank could be in an influential position even
before the after-acquired control became a reality. In instances where a
bank is placed in a controlling position by its realization on the security
of shares, a five-year divestment period is provided by section 76(4).
The section exempts the banks from a forced disposition which could
be prejudicial.
Section 76(5) is a discretionary provision. Except in certain circum-
stances, such as those envisioned by section 76(4), the Minister of Fi-
nance may order divestment of shares when a bank has effective control
over a trust or loan corporation through allowed holdings in ordinary
corporations.36 This subsection recognizes that listed percentages alone
are not always the measure of actual control and seeks to implement the
goal of competition between financial institutions. As a result, under
no circumstances of ownership may banks control trust and loan com-
panies.
Sections 76(6), 76(7), and 76(8) are corollaries to the previous re-
strictions and exceptions. A bank may exceed the limits set by section
76 so long as it divests itself within two years and the Minister has dis-
cretion to extend divestment periods so long as the aggregate of the ex-
tensions does not exceed two years. Finally, the Export Finance Corpo-
ration of Canada and bank service corporations, as defined in section
76(9), are exempted from the operation of section 76.
Section 76(9), the definitional subsection for the various corporations
34 PORTER Comm'N REPORT 372. "The purpose of [section 75(2) (b)] . .. is primarily
to ensure that banks do not overextend themselves in fields in which they are not expert
but it also acts to prevent intensive banking control of other businesses."
35 CAN. STAT. c. 87, § 75(2) (b) (1967).
36 It is only by way of controlling ownership that the legislation seeks to realize its
aims. The legislation does not aim at "marriages" that are not based in ownership.
There is no control over informal arrangements or common goals that may be present.
1971] 1135
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
named in the section, raises several issues. Bank service corporations,
which can be owned by a bank, are defined as those companies that hold
property for, provide ancillary services to, or own adjoining property
to the bank and its branches. While the section seems relatively clear
and harmless on its face, the exemption from section 76 of this type of
corporation has dramatic possibilities. In urban centers, where real
estate booms are big business, banks may effectively control major
Canadian corporations and actively engage in the real estate field
through the use of bank service corporations.3 7
A second issue raised by the definitions contained in section 76(9) is
the meaning of "trust and loan companies." As defined, the trust and
loan companies which banks may not control are those which are de-
scribed by the federal acts and which accept deposits from the public.
Without commenting on possible plans, the legislation suggests freedom
of activity in the provincial areas; 8 moreover, a bank need only divest
itself of the deposit-gathering function of a trust company and might
still retain control of a trust and loan company's investment counselling
services without violating the letter of the law.39
From a statutory viewpoint, section 76 is relatively clear. It is the
banking industry's view of, and reaction to, this section, however, that
is of primary importance. Section 76 must serve as a guide to future
banking policy.
The banking industry is extremely powerful in Canada. It is im-
portant to determine how the industry views this power and to what
ends this power will be applied. The definition of the banking function
by the Porter Commission, insofar as it is keyed to liquidity, probably is
more restrictive than that which would be urged by members of the
banking industry. The Porter Commission distinguished the baning
function on the basis of the liabilities which banks assume-that these
liabilities are liquid, and that the public uses them as a means of pay-
3 7 The ownership of plazas, shopping malls, office buildings, and the like must be
considered major activity when viewed in light of land values in urban centers. The
bank offices in ventures such as the T-D Centre are only a minor aspect of the business
that the Centre carries on.
38 There is no express prohibition on the ownership of provincially incorporated
trust companies. Regardless of the actual activity that is carried on, the definitions as
presented are narrow, to say the least.
39 A trust company can conduct a normal business while not accepting deposits from
the public; a bank retaining control over the trust company's operations will not be in




ment-and the Commission felt that banks must be defined in terms of
liquidity.40
Within the context of liquidity, banks perform two major functions:
They accept deposits and make loans. Traditionally, in this capacity they
are seen as a reflection of the national need,41 and when new facilities
or services are called for they are met relative to the overall financial
environment and the prevailing legal framework.42 The Bank Act estab-
lishes only the outer limits of this framework. The agency in charge
of applying the Act to the industry is the Bank of Canada, and its Gov-
ernor, Louis Rasminsky, has made it clear that the function of banking
is not strictly confined and that the role of financial intermediary is
merely an extension of this function.43
The Canadian chartered banks controlled approximately 42 percent
of all assets in the hands of Canadian financial intermediaries by the end
of 1968. 44 Effective management of these assets would be a difficult task
if liquidity were the sole criterion for bank investment. The need for
liquidity, however, remains an obvious concern for banks. This is re-
flected in the fact that by June 5, 1969, over 60 percent of total bank
assets were in loans of some kind. Statistics indicate that security hold-
ings are only three percent of total bank assets. Yet, if one assumes, as
do the banks in their own charting,45 that everything not a loan, cash
resource or other fixed asset is a security investment, the three percent
figure rises to between 25 and 30 percent. It would certainly appear
that the generalized statistics do not fully reflect current banking ac-
tivity.
Since the 1967 statutory revision, banks have experienced a sudden
and steady growth. The changes gave bankers an opportunity to ex-
pand their existing financial services. In fiscal 1968, total assets increased
by 15.6 percent, total loans by 13.2 percent, total securities by 19.3
40 Proceedings of the Standing Comm. on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs:
Decemnial Issue of the Bank Act, 27th Parliament, 1st Sess. 743 (1966).
41Coleman, The President Speaks, 75 THE CANADIAN BANKER 17, 18 (1968).
42 Id. at 18.
43Financing economic growth in a country like Canada involves transferring pur-
chasing power from those individuals who want to save to those who need to borrow.
Banks profit by supplying savers with a wide variety of financial obligations tailored to
the particular needs of the savers, and by allocating the resulting pool of funds to
borrowers in exchange for financial obligations which are tailored to the particular
needs of the borrowers. Remarks of Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the Bank of Can-
ada, before a meeting of the Institute of Canadian Bankers, Montreal, Jan. 20, 1969.
44 GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF CANADA, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF FINANCE
42-43 (1968).
45 1Remarks by J. H. Coleman, Vice President and General Manager of the Royal
Bank of Canada to the Toronto Society of Financial Analysts, Toronto, Oct. 16, 1968.
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percent and total cash resources by 21.4 percent.46 In absolute figures,
the bulk of new funds went into lending, and although the percentage
of total assets in securities dropped, there was an increase in the total
amount so invested.
The raising and subsequent elimination of the six percent interest
ceiling, permitted by section 91 of the 1967 Act, brought dramatic
change.4 7 This ceiling had long inhibited an aggressive banking policy
and, to a degree, had led to forced conservation. The limitation on the
amount banks could charge for use of their capital prevented banks from
participating in more lucrative but higher risk areas, such as consumer
lending.48 It also severely hindered banks in competing for the deposit
and savings dollar. In 1951, banks controlled 53 percent of the assets of
Canadian financial intermediaries; by 1962, they held only 46.7 per-
cent.49 Since the 1967 revisions, however, banks have been regaining
lost ground.
The competition for deposits, among banks themselves as well as with
other institutions, is evidenced by extended service, product differentia-
tion, and advertising. Using the interest rate as a means of competition,
however, could endanger stability in gross savings. At one point, com-
petitive bidding for large block funds of fixed term deposits became so
intense that Governor Rasminsky advised the banks against such activity.
Shortly thereafter, an informal ceiling on interest paid on deposits be-
came bank policy. Competition through diversity of services, how-
ever, has continued.
This competition has significantly increased the contact between the
banks and the public. The banks have introduced both business and in-
dividual consumers to the cashless society. The Bank of Nova Scotia, for
example, offers a low-cost "current account" which keeps track of daily
expenditures and income. In order to simplify payroll distribution, "pay-
roll accounts" serve as a method of saving on stationary costs, protecting a
business from loss or theft, and keeping payroll information confidential;
46 Id.
4 7 
"First established in 1777 in Quebec, maximum lending rates were subsequently set
for all banks. The rate was standardized at 7% in 1867 and remained there until 1944
when it was reduced to 6% as a move toward lower interest rates in a cash-short, post-
war world. The limit stayed at 6% until May 1, 1967 .... " Hopkins, Impact of the
Bank Act, 74 Tim CAmADIAN BANKER 52, 53 (1967).
48 It was not until the Bank Act revision of 1954 that the field of consumer lending
was made available to the banks. The banks, however, were reluctant to enter this higher
risk area too heavily, because of the six percent ceiling which had forced them to work
with a small margin of profit. The Bank of Nova Scotia was the most aggressive in the
area of consumer loans until the recent Bank Act revisions.
49 P. Lusztig, An Analysis of the Concentration of Economic Power in the Hands
of Institutional Investors: The Canadian Perspective 20 (1965) (unpublished).
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the company issues one paycheck, and the bank credits individual em-
ployee accounts. This device promotes the bank's business not only with
the company but with employees as well. Related to "payroll accounts"
is the more inclusive "lock box service" by which the bank does the
accounting for a particular business. The company has all its incoming
checks sent to a post office box, and the bank clears the box daily, adjusts
the company's accounts, and provides it with a convenient statement.
Banks also provide collection services, international banking services, and
financial and marketing information for business development. In addi-
tion, they have introduced a special instrument whereby businesses can
obtain short-term loans in blocks of $100,000 or more of the bank's
surplus funds. Some of these instruments are negotiable or transferable.
The same management facilities are, to an extent, available to the in-
dividual consumer. A nonchecking savings account was introduced, for
example, which brought the depositor more than six percent interest,
contrasted tothe older savings accounts with checking privileges which
yielded only three to three and one-half percent. Another variation in
the product offered to the public is the savings certificate, with terms
from one to six years, which earns the equivalent of about seven percent
simple interest per annum if held for six years. The depositor can pay
either by cash or by installments for his certificates, and they are re-
deemable at face value plus accumulated interest at any time, in any
branch of the issuing bank.
In the struggle for the savings dollar, other specialized installment
savings plans have been created. One includes life insurance on the
amount of the ultimate savings goal. The bank pays for the insurance,
but the customer applies directly to the insurance company for his
coverage. The plan usually requires monthly deposits for a term of ap-
proximately 50 months, and generally the maximum goal is appr9xi-
mately $3,000. If the depositor dies, his beneficiary or estate receives life
insurance in the amount of the savings goal, the total deposits to that
date, and a cash bonus based on the amount deposited.
In the area of debt, the most significant innovation has been the
introduction of bank credit cards and check guarantee cards. The Bank
of Nova Scotia and the Bank of Montreal use a check guarantee system
which is relatively inexpensive to establish.50 The Toronto-Dominion,
5OBusmnsm WK, Feb. 27, 1965, at 58. Because Chargex was not set up as an inde-
pendent corporation and its activity defined as a "financial service," the four banks
concerned were able to avoid any problems with the 50 percent, five million dollar
restriction of sections 76 (1) (a), (i) and (ii) of the Bank Act. This structure has also
proved valuable as a tax advantage since heavy initial losses encountered can be sub-
tracted from current profits. Thus, the banks have been able to finance a totally new
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the Commerce-Imperial, the Royal Bank, and La Banque Canadienne
Nationale jointly promote a bank credit card system, "Chargex," pat-
terned after the Bank of America plan implemented in California in
1959. 1 With "Chargex," banks have demonstrated the capability and
the technology to provide the individual consumer with service com-
parable to that provided to business.52 Lloyd Calver of the Toronto Do-
minion Centre states that the present Chargex system provides for in-
stant accounting. Excesses by the consumer are guarded against by a
floor limit-the maximum amount that can be transacted on any one
sale without verification through the computer center by the merchant-
and by computer scanning of the individual account. For amounts
above the floor limit, the merchant must phone the computer center to
have the account checked and to obtain a code number for that partic-
ular sale, Which number must be on the Chargex slip forwarded to the
bank. If the Chargex system is accepted, as trends in the United States
iidicate it will be, it is reasonable to believe that, ultimately, this check
will be accomplished through a touch-tone telephone system. By use of
computer language cards, the retail merchant will communicate directly
with the computer for information with respect to customer financial
ability.
Chargex is a continuation of the service, traditionally performed by
banks, providing the media to facilitate the exchange of goods or wealth.
Just as banks abandoned the haulage of coin boxes by stagecoaches, banks
will be compelled to use electronic circuitry to transfer money assets
from one individual to another. Although the function of Chargex
is one with which banks have long been familiar, the role of the banks
in this process is significantly different from their role in the check col-
lecting and paying process. With Chargex, banks are not intermedi-
aries; rather, they buy the accounts receivable and levy a floating charge
against the merchant and individual consumer. Member merchant ac-
counts are discounted from four to six percent. As sale volume in-
creases, regardless of profit the cash flow to the buying banks accelerates.
business operation without creating a new corporate entity. Internal financing of this
nature could affect other expanding industries, especially during periods of scarce
capital.
51 The system also features a 30-day free credit position for the public, but if the
amount outstanding is not paid within this period the balance is treated as a loan. The
interest on the balance is 1% percent per month (18% per annum) on balances up to
$500, and one percent per month (12% per annum) on balances exceeding $500.52 Remarks of J. H. Coleman, Vice President and General Manager, Royal Bank of
Canada, to Society of Financial Analysts, in Toronto, Oct. 16, 1968. Mr. Coleman also
pointed out that the Chargex system was not as profitable as that of its American
counterpart, nor even as some' of the other lending institutions in Canada, and that
efforts would be continued to increase the rate of return under this system.
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Thus, the success of the banks flows directly from the success of the
member-merchants.
The monthly invoice received by the individual consumer indicates
the minimum amount that need be paid. Pressure is not exerted to have
the consumer exercise his 30-day free credit. The credit card system
is not only a money-transfer mechanism but also a means of lending
money, and both of these are regarded by the industry as banking func-
tions. By performing these functions, the banks would seem to be at-
tempting to conform to their new image of being in the business of
filling the customer's need for financial services. The recognition of
the customer as the source of all profit would seem to be the basis for
this orientation.
Banking's new image is also promoted by recent innovations in bank
architecture and advertising. The marble edifice and hard-nosed credit
manager have largely been replaced by modern, informal interiors and
attractive girls in mini-skirts; television commercials project an image
similar to that of a friendly loan company. Of central importance to
the new image, however, is bank involvement and participation in the
business of the community.
BANK ACTIVITY AS IT RELATES TO EQUITIES
When the government freed the banks of Canada from the maximum
restrictions on fixed interest charges, it permitted the banks to retain
their position as the dominant financial institutions in Canada. Through
the banks' renewed strength, the government continued to enjoy strong
controls over monetary policy. The question remains, however, whether
the consumer will be benefited as well. Governor Rasminsky has argued
that consumer benefits flow not from undue concentration in the finan-
cial system but from improved access to credit, cheaper credit, or greater
return on savings.53
Profit, however, largely results from meeting consumer demands
which are more complex than simple access to credit, cheaper credit, or
greater return on savings. In seeking goods or services, consumers may
not always know what is in their best interest and, if they do, may not
be willing to make the rational choice.
Canadian banks remain concerned with the profitability of their op-
erations vis-a-vis other lending corporations in Canada and the American
banking industry.54 It is significant that Canadian banks have closely
53 Remarks of Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the Bank of Canada, to Institute of
Canadian Bankers, in Montreal, Jan. 20, 1969.
54 Bunting, One Bank Holding Companies: A Banker's View, lMv. Bus. REv., May-
June 1969, at 99. Mr. Bunting sets out the formula for a bank wishing to convert itself
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scrutinized the development of the American system. For example, al-
though the structure of Canadian banking is not amenable to the de-
velopment of one-bank holding companies,65 there may be a more subtle
means of creating a Canadian counterpart. Thus, there would seem to
be a common question, applicable both to the American and Canadian
industries, whether banks, because of their money-creating power,
legal protection from excessive competition and tremendous financial
strength, should be more limited than other corporations in their ability
to diversify and buy nonbanking companies.56
In examining the multifaceted role and potential of the Canadian
banking industry, the question arises as to what form any limitation
should take, if in fact there should be any limitation at all. If this ex-
amination reveals a complex industry not structured upon historic
norms, industry structure must be considered in determining which pub-
lic policy is to be observed in banking regulation.
In 1962, the Royal Bank, the Banque Canadienne Nationale, Montreal
Trust, the Canada Trust Co., and General Trust of Canada created Roy
Nat Ltd., the purpose of which was to provide financing for Canadian
business firms which were too large to take advantage of the Small Busi-
ness Loans Act but too small to go to the capital market.5 7 Of the $10
million subscribed to provide the paid-in capital, Royal accounted for
41.5 percent and Banque Nationale 34 percent. s Roy Nat lends amounts
of $25,000 or more at interest rates determined by the particular circum-
stances and takes mortgage bonds, debentures, preferred stock, unse-
cured notes or common stock as security; however, Roy Nat appar-
into a holding company. Essentially, the process involves the creation of a subsidiary,
a "phantom" corporation existing only on paper. The original stock of the parent
bank is then exchanged for shares in the subsidiary so that the stockholders wind up
owning the corporation, which has the bank as its only asset. Such a construction
would also allow banks to enter any industry, although all one-bank holding companies
have heretofore confined themselves to financial activities. Id. at 102. Bunting's formula
would encounter serious difficulties in Canada, however, since there is a limitation on
the holding of bank stock so that no one company could purchase all of the bank
shares. CAN. STAT. c. 87, § 67 (1967).
55 Nadler, One Bank Holding Companies: The Public Interest, HARv. Bus. REv., May-
June 1969, at 107.
56
RoYAL BANcK oF CANADA, SUBMISSION TO STANDING COhM. ON FINANCE, TRADE,
AND EcoNoMc AFFAIRS, app. V, at 2299 (1966).
571d.
58 Bank ownership of any more than 10 percent of a corporation's voting common
stock is clearly prohibited by section 76 of the Bank Act. At the hearings, it was gen-
erally agreed that Roy Nat would not be exempt under section 76(8) as a "bank service
corporation." The fact that the section was to be retroactive in effect was one of the
main reasons for Royal Bank's disclosure of purpose and its strong stand in seeking
changes in the original bill. Hearings before Standing Comm. on Finance, Trade and
Economic Affairs: Decennial Revision of the Bank Act, 27th Parl., 1st Sess. 837 (1966).
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ently does not seek control through ownership of a company's voting
stock.
Ownership by a bank of 10 percent of any corporation's voting com-
mon stock was prohibited by unamended clause 76 in the draft bill C-
222. In the discussions, it was generally agreed that Roy Nat would
not be exempt under section 76(8) as a "bank service corporation"; 59
moreover, clause 76 would be retroactive. Thus, the Royal Bank, by
disclosing Roy Nat's purpose, sought to have the bill changed. During
the hearings, the committee was concerned with the relationship be-
tween the five Roy Nat sponsors. At one point the Chairman noted
that ownership was not necessary for what he termed "a very useful
relationship" and the Royal Bank representative agreed. The Com-
mittee was assured that none of the sponsors would interfere in any way
with the operations of Roy Nat and the Royal Bank emphasized that no
one sponsor had a controlling position. The Royal Bank's representative
seemed successful in convincing the committee that no undesirable
effects would result and, indeed, that Roy Nat filled a gap in the Ca-
nadian economy. Operations such as Roy Nat, U.N.A.S. Investments,
Kinross Mortgage Corp., and Markborough Investments, Ltd. appear to
have been saved by the final amendments to section 76 which permit
bank ownership of more than ten percent of the corporations which do
not accept deposits. In fashioning the amendments, the legislators were
concerned with preventing concentration of power in the hands of a
few, but they also recognized the need to encourage the growth of
smaller business units and promote participation in new joint ventures.60
In some instances, the distinction between bank investment in debt
and in equity is blurred, and some loan agreements seem to fall into the
latter category. Recently, the Royal Bank agreed to loan Becker's Milk
59 Committee recognition of the pressing need for such amendments is shown in the
remarks of Canadian Finance Minister Sharp, who pointed out that the government
did not want to present proposals that would have an "unnecessary limiting effect upon
useful bank activity.' Financial Post, Mar. 18, 1967, at 19, col. 3.
60 The Porter Commission provided additional support for this position by stating that
it "did not wish to see the new legislation inhibit useful innovations and improvements
in the financial system by preventing or restricting bank participation in new joint
ventures... ." PORTER ComM'N REPoRT 371 (1964).
A good example of this type venture can be seen in the operation of a new private
company called International Capital Corporation Limited. The Royal Bank, in asso-
ciation with United Corporations Limited, is believed to hold a "substantial majority
of the stock." The company is expected to take minority equity positions in growth
companies that cannot readily obtain funds through other channels, although the pos-
sibility of control or outright purchase is not excluded. As a merchant bank, the
company can also provide management and financial services, and can act as a catalyst
for a group of investors. Financial Post Corp. Service, Current Info. Card on Royal
Bank of Canada (Mar. 7, 1969).
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Co. Ltd. up to $4 million.61 Becker is entitled to take down the loan
until December 31, 1971. The loan is secured by the issuance of a series
of debentures at an interest rate one percentage point above the bank's
prime rate existing at the time of issue. One of the conditions of the
loan is an "equity kicker," a device used by insurance companies for
years but, until recently, not used by banks.
Becker's Milk listed an additional 25,000 nonvoting participating class
B preferred shares without nominal or par value. The Bank purchased
13,000 of these shares at a price of $16.37, a figure roughly five dollars
above the market price. The Bank is also entitled to receive warrants
to purchase an additional 12,000 class B shares. For every $500,000 of
loan taken down by Becker, Royal receives 2,000 warrants for class B
shares. Each warrant will purchase one share at 10 percent above what
the closing bid price was on the day before the take-down of the loan.
Such equity participation by banks is no longer unusual. Bank of
Canada statistics62 indicate that in 1968 nonbank investors increased
their new corporate stock holdings by approximately 50 percent over
those in 1966, while the banks increased their security holdings by over
30 percent.
The willingness of banks to participate in industrial operations was
evidenced recently by a proposal made by Maclean-Hunter Cable TV
Ltd.63 The Toronto-Dominion Bank indicated a willingness to provide
much of the financing necessary to cable the Niagara Frontier if it could
obtain up to 30 percent of the equity in the venture. The Canadian
Radio-Television Commission refused to allow this, expressing concern
over the long-term implications of allowing banks to take equity posi-
tions in licensee corporations."
The extent to which the dynamism displayed by the larger banks will
affect governmental efforts to increase competition by establishing a
severed relationship between banks and trust companies is still unclear.
For example, both the Scotia and Toronto-Dominion must dispose of
more than 857,000 shares, with an estimated value of $9.5 million, be-
fore July 1, 1971. Assuming that the restrictions in the Bank Act will
require a number of other divestitures, perhaps of equal or greater mag-
nitude, one can appreciate possible difficulties which may arise in lo-
cating buyers. The prohibitions of interlocking directorships"5 and the
61Financial Post Corp. Service, Report on Becker's Milk Co. Ltd. (Dec. 23, 1968).
6 2 Gov RoR's ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 48.
63 Toronto Globe & Mail, Apr. 17, 1969, § B, at 3, col. 9.
64 C". RADio-TV Com'N DEc. No. 69-320, July 28, 1969, at 2. It is interesting to
note that at the time equity participation was sought, the bank was still willing to
finance the operation if such ownership participation was found to be undesireable.
6 5 CA. STAT. C. 87, § 18 (1967).
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10 percent limitation of holdings66 with respect to trust and loan com-
panies are not all-encompassing since the definition of loan and trust
companies requires the acceptance of deposits from the public.67 Thus,
it may be possible for banks to sell the deposit-accepting portions of their
affiliated trust or loan companies and be limited only by the more liberal
restrictions in sections 18 and 76 of the Bank Act, which control owner-
ship and interlocking directorships in other Canadian corporations.
68
It is easy to understand the criticism of the limitations imposed by sec-
tions 18 and 76 by C. F. Mackenzee, President of Canada Permanent
Mortgage Corporation, who recognizes the relative security from take-
over which results when a chartered bank has a substantial holding in
a company such as Canada Permanent; moreover, insofar as the new leg-
islation forbids a bank director from being a director of a loan or trust
company, Canada Permanent could potentially lose the services of 14
directors. 69
Chartered banks own extensive trust operations in other jurisdictions.
If banks decided to participate actively in the fiduciary and management
aspects of trust company business, not only could they acquire up to
50 percent or $5 million in a corporation of this sort, but could also farm
such business to their foreign trust subsidiaries. The larger Canadian
banks have sufficient built-in expertise in their foreign trust operations
to establish their own fiduciary enterprises in Canada without the need
for acquisition. Accordingly, the Porter Commission recommendations
become even more difficult to implement. Legislative enactment, by
itself, may not be able to achieve the desired separation between banks
and trust companies because banks have too great an interest in trust
company operations.
By offering portfolio investment services for investors, banks are
661d. § 76.
67 The words "and that accepts deposits from the public" are found both in section
76(9) (d) and section 18(6) (a) of the Bank Act dealing with share ownership and inter-
locking directorships.
68 Section 18(7) provides: "A person who is a director of a [Canadian] corporation
... is not eligible to be ...a director of the bank after the first day of July, 1971,
when other directors of the bank constitute one-fifth or more of the board of directors
of the corporation."
69 The services of the bank directors who are members of Canada Permanents board
have not been lost entirely. In 1966 H. S. Gooderham and F. G. Gardner were directors
of both Canada Permanent Mortgage Corp. and of the Toronto-Dominion Bank. In
1968, their positions were slightly altered so that neither Gooderham nor Gardner were
directors of the Toronto-Dominion Bank; however, Gardner remained a director of
Canada Permanent and an officer of the Toronto-Dominion Bank while Gooderham
was a Director of Canada Permanent and an officer of Canada Permanent Trust.
Although Mr. Gardner's association with the Toronto-Dominion Bank is still substan-
tial, it does not seem to be contrary to law.
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competing with the mutual funds which, historically, have held them-
selves out as specialists, skilled in the ways of the equity market. For
example, Roy Fund Ltd. is associated with the Royal Bank of Canada;
and Corporate Investors Ltd. is partially owned by the Toronto-Do-
minion Bank.
Each bank has a different approach to fund operations. Roy Fund is
distributed by Roy Fund Distributors Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary
of United Bond and Share Ltd. The Royal Bank claims to have no
ownership interest in either company, and its relationship with Roy
Fund is described as an attachment with no equity position.7° T. H.
Coleman and J. B. Morgan, two key officers of Royal, are listed on the
1968 Roy Fund board of directors. Among the features advertised by
Roy Fund are a maximum acquisition charge of three percent, the right
to purchase fractional shares, and no charge for redemption. The reason
given for the relatively low acquisition charge is the absence of broker-
age fees. Roy Fund shares are available solely through Royal Bank
branches. Royal receives compensation as the Fund's transfer agent,
shares in the three percent commission for processing sales, and provides
fund and shareholder accounting services71 thus participating in the
management fee of one-half of one percent.
The association between Toronto-Dominion and Corporate In-
vestors Ltd. is quite different. Corporate Investors Ltd.'s authorized
capital includes six million class A shares and 4,000 class B shares, each
with a par value of 25 cents.72 The two classes have similar rights except
that class B shares are not subject to redemption and have the right, vot-
ing separately and as a class, to elect three members of the board.73
The Toronto-Dominion Bank has realistic control over company op-
erations through its 100 percent ownership of the class B shares.74 Yet,
because the class A shares have voting rights, the bank is within the 50
percent limit of section 76, and because of the nominal value of the class
B shares, the bank is also well within the $5 million limit. Unlike Roy
Fund, the acquisition charge for Corporate Investors is 8 /2 percent. Un-
der its agreement with Corporate Investors Ltd., Toronto-Dominion
provides- management, administrative, and investment counseling services
to the Fund; and Loomis, Sayles & Co. (Canada) Ltd. is under contract
to the marketing division to manage the portfolio for the Fund. Cor-
porate Investors pays the distributor one-half of one percent per annum
70 Financial Post, Apr. 22, 1967, at 24, col. 2.
71 Id.
72 CoRpORATE INVwsroRs LTD., PROsPECrus 3 (Apr. 26, 1968).
7a Id. at 4.
74 Id. at 6.
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of net fund assets for its services.75 The Toronto-Dominion Bank owns
50 percent of Corporate Investors (Marketing) Ltd. and 50 percent of
Loomis, Sayles & Co. (Canada) Ltd. The other 50 percent of the-two
companies is owned by Loomis, Sayles & Co., Inc. (Boston).
For the most part, these bank-investment service relationships have
worked quite well, the only sign of difficulty arising from differences in
the nature of their corporate structures. Toronto-Dominion was re-
fused permission by the Quebec Securities Commission to have details
about Corporate Investors Ltd. available at its branch counters, presum-
ably because of its equity position in the company.7 6
Comparison of the services provided by Royal Bank and the Toronto-
Dominion reveal differences only of degree. Royal performs the tra-
ditional functions of a bank, acting as transfer agent and accountant in
merely accepting orders for Roy Fund at its branches. Nevertheless,
Royal's business volume and its compensation for services rendered are
directly tied to the performance and success of Roy Fund. Clearly,
Royal has no less an interest in Roy Fund, despite the lack of owner-
ship, than the Toronto-Dominion has in Corporate Investors. Nonethe-
less, the Toronto-Dominion has involved itself directly in managing
Corporate Investors, while Royal has acted with greater restraint.
The Royal Bank, however, has moved decisively in areas in which
express legal sanction has been given. For example, prior to the new
provisions, banks had been able to invest in bonds and debentures issued
against mortgage securities, but had been prohibited from granting
mortgage credit directly. Banks are now permitted to make conven-
tional mortgage loans by section 75 of the Act,7 7 and in order to remain
flexible and continue to take on new mortgages at the ever-increasing
rates of return, they have been developing a second mortgage market.78
An example of this is Royal Bank's establishment of Roymor Ltd., an
entity purchasing mortgages which have originated in and been proc-
essed by the bank. Royal is an equal partner in the venture with In-
terior Trust Co. of Winnipeg.79
75 d. at 7.
76 Royal Bank did not encounter this problem with Roy Fund, and Toronto-Domin-
ion has not encountered the same difficulty in other provinces.
77 CAN. STAT. c. 87, § 75 (1967). This change recognizes that banks no longer concern
themselves primarily with short-term loans. The law contemplates an appropriate
degree of liquidity in light of the well-defined cash requirements which will confront
the bank at any particular time.
78 Remarks by J. H. Coleman, supra note 45.
79 Interior Trust is owned as follows: 40 percent by Royal Bank, 40 percent by the
United Corp., Ltd, and 20 percent by St. Maurice Gas Inc. Royal Bank owns less than
a 10 percent interest in St. Maurice Gas. Financial Post Corp. Serv., Current Info. Card
on Royal Bank of Canada (Mar. 7, 1969).
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Closely related to mortgage activity is the activity permitted by sec-
tion 76(8) which exempts holdings in "bank service corporations." All
of the banks seem to have taken advantage of this provision and have
created companies to hold their realty. The Toronto-Dominion Bank
and Cemp Investments Ltd. are equal partners in the Toronto-Dominion
Centre Limited. The company owns and operates a $145 million com-
mercial complex in downtown Toronto, which includes a banking mall
and plaza. There are similar operations underway throughout Canada."0
The Toronto-Dominion's equal partners in a multimillion dollar project
in Vancouver are the T. Eaton Co. of Canada and Cemp Investments
Ltd. This development will include a Toronto-Dominion Bank Tower,
an Eaton's Department Store, a shopping mall, two office buildings, and
a hotel.8'
CONCLUSION
Are the Toronto-Dominion's interests, outlined above, within the 50
percent, five million dollar limitation, or are these developments exempt
from these restrictions because they qualify as bank service corporations?
If the latter is correct, a question arises concerning the extent to which
a bank may be permitted to become involved in commercial operations
through the use of a bank service corporation. Banks are not content
merely to act as lending institutions; instead, they seek to share actively
in the profits of community development. To the extent that they will
also be sharing in the losses, rather than receiving a fixed return by way
of interest, they may provide less security than in the past. It is unclear
whether the banks' view of themselves and the role they are in fact play-
ing comport with public policy, perhaps because public policy has not
been clearly formulated.
Section 76, which deals specifically with bank ownership of corporate
stock, presented an opportunity to shape public policy, and the amend-
ments to the original bill were made specifically to accommodate the
banks' holdings in such companies as Roy Nat, Kinross, and U.N.A.S.
New provisions in the section also permit banks to invest up to five
million dollars in voting stock, giving them leeway to make arrangements
to control almost any Canadian corporation; moreover, the new limita-
tion is not on total investment but rather on investment in voting
stock. 2 The wording thus effectively eliminates any restrictions on
chartered banks from gaining control of a majority of Canadian corpora-
S0 TORONTo-DoMNION BANK, ANNuAL REPORT 2 (1968).
81 Id. at 6.
82 Hearings, supra note 58, at 3329.
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tions. 83 Section 76 also prohibits banks from holding more than 50 per-
cent of the voting stock of any Canadian corporation;84 however, this
restriction easily can be avoided by the skillful use of associated holding
companies.
As a result of competition, bankers have begun to respond to a grow-
ing consumer demand. Out of this response has emerged the bank
which can render, directly or indirectly, any service sought by the con-
sumer. In an industry where federal power, at least in theory, is absolute,
this expansion could not have occurred without government consent.
The government could have restricted the banks to a traditional role
emphasizing liquidity and deposit protection, but it chose not to do so.
This decision may have been based upon the desire to maintain banks
as the dominant financial institution, thereby allowing efficient execu-
tion of monetary policy.
Other alternatives existed. The decision might have been made to
maintain the dominance of the industry without maintaining the prevail-
ing exclusivity of the banking fraternity. For example, the government
could have followed the recommendations of the 1964 Royal Commis-
sion on Banking and Finance and permitted trust companies to act as
banks with grant of a federal charter. Equity oriented banks, however,
are in a position through size to dampen interinstitutional competition.
Through acquisition and advertising, they may bring to bear the full
weight of the national enterprise in any one of their branches.
Moreover, banks are moving into positions of major influence in non-
financial enterprises. In a single business, a bank can be a lender of
funds, holder of equity, depository of corporate revenue, accountant,
director, and financial advisor. What makes this alliance potentially un-
healthy is the possibility that corporate goals may be-or, indeed, in
some cases should be-at variance with bank objectives, particularly if
the latter are purely short-term objectives. As a matter of policy the
Canadian Radio-Television Commission has made unequivocal its view
that banks and other financial institutions should not be permitted equity
participation as a condition to funding broadcasters. Licensees have a
fundamental, exclusive responsibility to the Commission and, through
it, to the public. No other group or business, as a matter of public
policy, should be allowed to dilute that obligation.
This determination of public policy has not been made in areas in-
83 Id. The Committee hypothetically suggested the situation where a bank, along
with five million dollars in voting stock, might also take up to $100 million in nonvoting
preferred stock and even more, should they desire, in debentures. Total investment is
unlimited for all practical purposes.
84 CAN. STAT. c. 87, § 76 (1967).
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volving the banks' equity participation in corporations not licensed by
the Canadian Radio-Television Commission. Ownership of voting stock
is not the only means by which a controlling influence can be exerted
over a corporation; especially in light of the bank service corporation,
it is at least questionable whether there are any realistic limitations on
the banks' ability to control Canadian business corporations.
